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Taking the Framers Seriously 
William Michael Treanort 
Taking the Constitution Seriously. Walter Berns. Simon and 
Schuster, 1987. Pp. 287. $19.95. 
Walter Berns's Taking the Constitution Seriously1 champions 
a familiar thesis: the original meaning of the Constitution, Berns 
contends, is readily understandable and remains binding today. In 
addition, as with most other leading proponents of original intent, 
Berns's conception of the framers' intent accords with a modern 
conservative political agenda. Among the elements of his constitu-
tional jurisprudence are opposition to judicial activism, a belief 
that the proper role of the national government is a very limited 
one, a strong commitment to the rights of property, and a convic-
tion that the individual states can support the "moral education" 
(p. 222) of their citizens without running afoul of the first 
amendment. 
Unlike most of the legal literature on original intent, however, 
the principal concern of Taking the Constitution Seriously is not 
with what the framers intended specific constitutional clauses to 
mean. Rather, Berns's principal concern is to reveal the political 
philosophy behind the Constitution, a philosophy which, he main-
tains, should inform our reading of the document. In delineating 
that philosophy, Berns relies on the constitutional text and on a 
handful of documents that either elucidate it, such as The Feder-
alist Papers, or partake of the same world view as the Constitu-
tion, such as the Declaration of Independence. 
Behind Berns's conception of the Constitution is a recognition 
of the fact that the world of the framers was a world in transition. 
In late eighteenth century America, pre-modern, pre-commercial 
society was ending. In its place, modern liberal (using the word in 
t B.A. 1979, Yale University. A.M. 1982, Harvard University. J.D. 1985, Yale Univer-
sity. I would like to thank Morton Horwitz, Mike Koessel, Bill Nelson, Gene Sperling, Pat 
Wechsler, and Evan Wolfson for their help in the preparation of this review. 
' Walter Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously (1987). All parenthetical page refer-
ences in text and notes are to this work. 
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its philosophical sense) commercial society was emerging. The 
framers, as depicted by Berns, were on the side of the winners, and 
their plan for the national government reflected their commitment 
to the new world. In writing the Constitution, the framers rejected 
the ideology dominant in pre-modern society, which held that the 
state's primary role was to define and inculcate virtue and that 
commercial life posed a threat to that virtue. In other words (to 
use a term that Berns does not use), the framers rejected classical 
republicanism. 
Berns's framers opted instead for liberalism. Thus, the Consti-
tution evidences a belief in the primacy of individual rights and in 
the importance of constraints on the national government; it em-
bodies a commitment to the value of commerce and to the legiti-
macy of the pursuit of economic self-interest. At the same time, 
Berns contends that the Constitution did not represent a complete 
triumph for the forces of modernity. While it ensured that the na-
tional government would not be in the business of promoting and 
regulating morality, it did not so limit the individual state govern-
ments. The framers intentionally left the states free to engage in 
the older form of politics. In short, the national government was 
constructed on liberal principles, but the states could in important 
ways operate in accordance with republican principles. 
Taking the Constitution Seriously is an imaginative, often en-
gaging, but unconvincing book. As a work of constitutional philos-
ophy, it is unsatisfying. On critical points, Berns's theory is incon-
sistent with his recommendations on how courts should act, and he 
fails to justify (or even fully acknowledge) those inconsistencies. 
But the more significant flaw in Berns's analysis is that, having 
implicitly recognized the transitional character of the world of the 
founding fathers, he fails to accord that fact appropriate signifi-
cance. He assumes that our concerns and desires were the concerns 
and desires of the framers, that the framers had in some way come 
fully to terms with a modern world that they scarcely could have 
anticipated, and that their thought can be assimilated easily into 
our current policy debates. Those assumptions lead to a misread-
ing of the framers that obscures the insights they have to offer. 
This review will focus on three of the key historical points that 
Berns makes: his arguments that the Declaration of Independence 
is a Lockean document; that the Constitution encapsulates the po-
litical philosophy of the Declaration; and that the framers viewed 
the commercialization of society as a salutary development and 
were unambivalent champions of the right to property. Examina-
tion of these issues suggests that the ideological universe of the 
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framers was far more complex than Berns indicates. While the rev-
olutionary era witnessed a new concern with individual rights and 
a greater acceptance of the value of commerce, older notions of 
communitarianism, of public good, and of civic obligation re-
mained powerful. In the revolutionary era and the early national 
period, the dominant ideological impulse was to attempt a synthe-
sis that reflected both republican ideas and new realities, rather 
than simply to reject republicanism in favor of the brand of liber-
alism described by Berns. Thus, an attempt to honor the framers' 
intent does not lead to Berns's constitutional jurisprudence. 
In addition, this review briefly examines another of Berns's 
historical claims: he maintains that the fourteenth amendment's 
due process clause was intended by its authors to refer only to pro-
cedural due process. This claim is important to Berns's overall ar-
gument because it is his contention that no constitutional develop-
ment after ratification of the Constitution fundamentally altered 
the role of the federal courts with respect to the states. In support 
of his conclusion, Berns asserts that the framers of the fourteenth 
amendment intended that the provision should have a very limited 
effect and that this intent should be respected. Berns's contention 
that original intent (both of the framers of the Constitution and of 
the fourteenth amendment) can and must be outcome determina-
tive raises issues beyond the scope of this review. But a look at 
pre-fourteenth amendment due process cases (cases to which re-
cent scholars have paid little attention) offers an example of why 
textual interpretation is a far more complex matter than Berns in-
dicates. Such examination also suggests one way in which an ex-
pansive reading of due process can be harmonized with framers' 
intent. 
* * * * 
At the outset of Taking the Constitution Seriously, Berns de-
scribes the book as "an explanation of the Constitution by refer-
ence to the Declaration of Independence" (p. 11). The framers, 
Berns writes in explaining the relationship that he sees between 
the two documents, believed that a free government was the prod-
uct of two compacts. As one manifestation of this view, he quotes 
from a letter that Madison wrote toward the end of his life: 
Altho, the old idea of a compact between the Govt & the peo-
ple be justly exploded, the idea of a compact among those who 
are parties to a Govt is a fundamental principle of free Govt. 
The original compact is the one implied or presumed, but 
nowhere reduced to writing, by which a people agree to form 
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one society. The next is a compact, here for the first time re-
duced to writing, by which the people in their social state 
agree to a Govt over them (p. 24).2 
The second compact in this country was the Constitution; the first 
was the agreement among the colonists in 1776 to sever their ties 
with England and form a new people. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence was not itself the original compact, since the agreement is 
"nowhere reduced to writing." But Berns contends that the Decla-
ration explained the original compact, articulating the reasons why 
Americans had decided to become a separate society and the prin-
ciples of political society they believed most important. 
While the notion of an original compact can be traced back to 
Hobbes, as well as Locke, Berns finds the Lockean influence on the 
Declaration to be more direct. The Declaration, he writes, was "in-
spired or informed by the political theory set forth by John Locke 
in the Letter [on Toleration] and the Second Treatise ... " (p. 
161). Because they embraced Locke and his natural rights philoso-
phy, "the Americans of 1776 asserted their rights as men, not as 
Englishmen; they appealed not to the laws of the realm but to the 
laws of nature and of nature's God" (p. 31). 
The key to understanding the principles of 1776 and of the 
Declaration (which Berns assumes are the same) thus becomes the 
question of what are natural rights, or, to use the language of the 
Declaration, what are unalienable rights. The Declaration provides 
an obvious source of guidance. It states that "among these 
[unalienable rights] are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."3 
But the starting points for Berns's analysis is not the Declaration's 
text or a historical inquiry into what the framers thought natural 
rights to be. Rather, he starts from the premise that there are in 
fact determinable rights "possessed by everybody irrespective of 
nationality, color, faith, gender, or ethnic affiliation" (p. 28). They 
are universal because they are grounded in human nature (p. 28). 
Taking the Constitution Seriously does not attempt to enu-
merate those rights completely, but it does provide a partial list of 
rights, all of which, Berns finds, had been previously recognized by 
Locke. "[T]he most basic of human rights," according to Berns, 
"[is] the right to consent to government, or the right to govern 
oneself" (p. 224). Liberty of conscience is also an unalienable right 
2 Quoting letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (February 15, 1830), in Gail-
lard Hunt, ed., 9 The Writings of James Madison 355 (1910). 
3 Declaration of Independence para. 3 (1776). 
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(pp. 160-61). A third unalienable right (and a right that plays a 
critical role in Berns's jurisprudence) is the right to property. Why 
are such rights fundamental? Berns quotes with approval Justice 
William Paterson's 1795 decision in the circuit court case of Van 
Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance: 
It is evident, that the right of acquiring and possessing prop-
erty, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, 
and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: 
Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent 
to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the 
objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would 
become a member of a community, in which he could not en-
joy the fruits of his honest labour and industry. The preserva-
tion of property then is a primary object of the social compact 
(pp. 225-26).4 
Berns maintains that the commitment to natural rights evi-
denced by the Declaration also informed the Constitution. Revolu-
tionary era Americans had been schooled in natural rights philoso-
phy and accepted its teachings, and the Constitution, like the 
Declaration, reflected this consensus. "[B]ecause there was a gen-
eral agreement that these rights were indeed fundamental, we the 
people were able to institute a government designed to secure 
them" (p. 225). The principles of the Declaration thus became the 
principles of government: "[The] Constitution did what the Decla-
ration of Independence says must be done ... : it instituted a gov-
ernment that secures human rights" (p. 121). 
The Constitution has succeeded in securing human rights, 
Berns argues, primarily because it is animated by the belief that 
"government is supposed to leave us alone" (p. 149). The whole 
structure of the Constitution-its system of checks and balances, 
the establishment of an independent judiciary, its "ENLARGE-
MENT of the ORBIT" (p. 131)11 of governance to reflect a multi-
plicity of competing interests, and its system of representation 
designed to put some "distance ... between the people and their 
representatives" (p. 144)-was intended to restrain the powers of 
government. According to Berns, the Constitution thus promotes 
liberty in a very direct fashion by limiting governmental power. 
The framers also believed that the Constitution would pro-
' Quoting 2 Dall. 304, 309 (Pa. 1795). The original text uses the term "inalienable 
rights," but Berns's quotation substitutes the term "unalienable rights." 
• Quoting Federalist 9, in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 71, 73 (1961). 
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mote liberty in an important indirect way. They expected that the 
Constitution's limitations on governmental power would serve to 
protect the property right. When the property right is secured, 
people devote themselves to a life of commerce. They pursue pri-
vate happiness, not public happiness, and this shift is beneficial. 
When people devote their lives to the public arena, they seek as-
cendancy for themselves or their political or religious causes, and 
this ascendancy can be achieved only at the expense of individual 
freedom. When they seek profit, they leave others alone. Berns 
writes: 
By taking government out of the business of promoting 
morals and virtue, to use Rousseau's terms, they [the Fram-
ers] expected material gratification, or comfortable preserva-
tion, to emerge as the primary object of men's passions. In the 
past, governments had in one way or another attempted to 
suppress these passions, but the commercial republic would be 
built on them. The authors of The Federalist had learned 
from Montesquieu . . . that commerce cures destructive 
prejudices, that it "softens barbaric morals," that it causes 
men to lose their taste for personal glory or conquest or desire 
for salvation, or any of the other things giving rise to destruc-
tive factions. It makes men "soft," but it makes constitutional 
government possible (pp. 177 -78) (citation omitted). 
Pre-modern thinkers had treated commerce as a source of corrup-
tion. In contrast, the framers enthusiastically championed com-
merce and the right to property-not because self-interest was a 
good in itself, but because its encouragement advanced the cause 
of liberty-and they devised a constitutional system in which indi-
vidual pursuit of self-interest served as a bulwark against the 
abuse of state power. The Constitution realized what Berns de-
scribes as Locke's goal: "[T]he Leviathan ... is transformed into 
the modern liberal state" (p. 172). 
Thus, Berns pictures the framers as Lockean liberals, individ-
uals committed to limited government, who believed the primary 
purpose of government to be the protection of individual rights. At 
the same time, he argues that their system of government was not 
purely liberal. Partly because the framers did not rigorously apply 
their political philosophy to the states and partly because the Anti-
Federalists wished to preserve state power, the Constitution did 
not take the states "out of the business of promoting morals and 
virtue." Berns writes, "[A]lthough the Framers (including all the 
lawyers among them) knew that their principles forbade the use of 
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the laws directly to generate virtuous habits, they did not regard it 
as improper for the laws, and in practice this meant the laws of the 
states, to support the private institutions in which these habits had 
been generated and were to be generated" (p. 220). Because "the 
Framers expected the states to provide the sort of civic or moral 
education required of citizens in a republican regime," (p. 222) re-
cent Supreme Court opinions holding that the state governments 
"must be neutral not merely between religions but between reli-
gion and irreligion ... [are] not at all what the First Amendment 
meant to the men who added it to the Constitution" (p. 222). 
Berns contends that the framers' vision of a liberal national 
government and non-liberal state governments is one that must 
still be respected. The Bill of Rights did not alter that vision, he 
argues, since its limitations were intended to apply only to the na-
tional government (pp. 124-29).6 
Moreover, the fourteenth amendment was not inconsistent 
with this aspect of the framers' plans. The privileges or immunities 
clause allowed Congress to enumerate the privileges or immunities 
of national citizenship. Congress, however, initially failed to make 
a serious effort to exercise its powers under this clause, and the 
Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases7 effectively 
stripped Congress of the powers that it could rightfully exercise 
under the clause (pp. 210-11). "Read literally" (and a literal read-
ing is the methodology that Berns believes those with due respect 
for framers' intent are required to use), the due process and equal 
protection clauses should have had a very limited effect (p. 212). 
Berns writes, "Only by distortion of their terms could either of 
these clauses be made a measure of the constitutionality of state 
legislation" (p. 212). Due process merely requires state courts to 
follow accepted processes of law. Substantive due process decisions 
are not sanctioned by the clause, Berns contends, since substantive 
due process has "nothing whatever to do with the process of law" 
(p. 213). Similarly, equal protection merely means that the state 
executive cannot discriminate in the enforcement of laws: "Gover-
nors and sheriffs and the rest were now, for the first time, under a 
national constitutional obligation to provide the protection of the 
laws to any person within the jurisdiction of their states or coun-
ties" (p. 212). The clause was not intended to have any broader 
• This is particularly the case, Berns argues, since Madison's proposal for an amend-
ment prohibiting the states from infringing on various freedoms, including freedom of con-
science, was rejected by the Senate (p. 168). 
7 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
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meaning. 
Berns also contends that the courts cannot "update" the fram-
ers' vision of the constitutional system. The author devotes a chap-
ter to criticisms of judicial activism (pp. 192-231). He singles out 
Justice William Brennan's comment that "[t]he genius of the Con-
stitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a 
world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great 
principles to cope with current problems and current needs" (pp. 
206-07).8 Berns contends that such statements indicate an illegiti-
mate preference for the policy judgments of an unelected judiciary 
over the decisions embedded in the Constitution, which "is an act 
of the people in their constituting capacity" (p. 237). Moreover, 
Berns argues that since the constitutional convention decided not 
to establish a council of revision, in which members of the judici-
ary in combination with the executive would have had veto power 
over legislation, the framers clearly intended to deny the judiciary 
any role in policy making. He concludes that the judiciary should 
simply focus on the constitutional text and original intent. The re-
sultant judicial role is a highly constrained one. Berns's comments 
about the impropriety of judicial "amendment" of the Constitution 
is indicative of his general view of the Constitution, properly un-
derstood: "[T]here is nothing obscure about that text, or nothing 
so obscure as to defy a search for its true meaning" (p. 240). 
Taken together, the various elements of Berns's analysis com-
bine to form a conservative constitutional agenda: a limited role 
for the federal government; a strong degree of concern for property 
rights; opposition to judicial activism and to expansive definitions 
of natural rights; a belief in the constitutionality of state activities 
designed to inculcate virtue. 9 The way in which he grounds this 
• Quoting William Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, paper presented at Georgetown University, October 12, 1985, 7. The paper is 
reproduced in 27 So.Tex.L.Rev. 433 (1986). 
• In his conclusion Berns writes: 
[T]o speak of a conservative agenda is almost a contradiction, an oxymoron. Conserva-
tives certainly cannot simply take stands opposite to those taken by liberals. They can-
not, for example, adopt a program favoring primogeniture, laws of entail, titles of no-
bility, a social class structure, an established church, drawing and quartering, or any 
other traditional (but cruel and unusual) form of punishment. These causes are denied 
to conservatives by the Constitution; or better, the Framers of the Constitution de-
prived Americans of much, if not all, of a traditional conservative agenda .... The 
only appropriate agenda for conservatives is to defend the liberal Constitution-if nec-
essary, to defend it from liberals-because by that Constitutional rights are secured 
(pp. 240-41). 
Here, Berns is playing with the terms conservative and liberal. His vision of the Consti-
tution is not conservative by eighteenth century standards. At the same time, it unquestion-
1024 The University of Chicago Law Review [55:1016 
agenda in framers' intent is creative. Berns could not have de-
fended his constitutional jurisprudence by focusing exclusively on 
the text of any one document or the writings of any one thinker. 
The Constitution is not on its face a natural rights document. The 
Bill of Rights is arguably a natural rights document, but Berns 
minimizes its importance; one suspects this treatment is due in 
part to the Bill of Rights' open-ended language, which invites the 
kind of judicial activism that Berns opposes. "[A]n explanation of 
the Constitution by reference to the Declaration" allows a reading 
of natural rights into the Constitution without the need to rely on 
the Bill of Rights. At the same time, the language of the Declara-
tion-in particular the statement that "all men are created equal, 
[and] that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able rights"-also seems open-ended. But Berns limits the reach of 
this language by reading the Declaration as a Lockean document 
and by indicating that the Declaration and the Constitution share 
the same fundamental concerns. Thus, both Locke's and the Con-
stitution's concerns for the protection of property are read into the 
Declaration, even though the Declaration does not mention the 
right of property as an unalienable right. 
Another problem in grounding Bern's constitutional jurispru-
dence in the world view of the framers is that state inculcation of 
virtue comports neither with the liberal philosophy that he con-
tends is behind the Declaration nor the liberal philosophy that he 
finds behind the Constitution. Berns resolves this problem as well 
through synthesis: he concludes that state promotion of religion is 
legitimate, not because the framers' ideology sanctioned it, but be-
cause the Constitution does not make the framers' ideology bind-
ing on the state governments. 
Berns's explanation of his constitutional philosophy does not 
adequately respond to a number of questions that his approach ob-
viously suggests. For example, the interpretive methodology he 
uses in explaining the Constitution is inconsistent with a denuncia-
tion of judicial activism. In other words, Berns's enterprise in this 
book is to ascertain at a relatively high level of generality the val-
ues implicit in the Constitution and then to urge that those values 
be applied today. This approach is an odd one for an individual 
who claims that constitutional interpretation should focus on text 
and pursue a very narrow search for original meaning; it is, how-
ever, quite similar to the approach employed by judges who 
ably accords with a recognizably conservative political agenda in current terms. 
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"adapt" the Constitution. Berns never focuses on why he believes 
his use of this interpretive methodology yields a proper under-
standing of the Constitution, whereas judicial use of it is tanta-
mount to deciding cases by personal whim. 
Berns also fails to provide a coherent analysis when, in his dis-
cussion of the right to privacy, he confronts a tension between his 
proclaimed rights commitment and the evident conservative bias 
of his jurisprudence. The right to privacy would appear to be the 
quintessential human right for Berns, since he defines human 
rights as rights grounded in human nature. Moreover, it would ap-
pear to be a fundamental right in a government founded on the 
principle that the individual should be let alone by the govern-
ment. "Constitutional government," Berns writes, "leaves men 
alone to the extent that it can; it certainly does not meddle in their 
private lives, and it gives an extensive definition to what is prop-
erly private" (pp. 154-55). Nonetheless, Berns rejects the idea that 
the Constitution guarantees a right to privacy. Moreover, he is par-
ticularly critical of Justice Blackmun's championing of such a right 
in his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick. 10 
That dissent asserts that the case, which involved the consti-
tutionality of Georgia's anti-sodomy law, implicates the right to be 
let alone. Berns responds that the right involved is the right to 
engage in private, consensual sexual activity. This is not a right, 
Berns indicates, because it is not generally accepted: "Strictly 
speaking, our rights may have their foundation in nature or in a 
duly enacted statute, but for their security they depend ultimately 
on the support not only of the public official but of public opinion" 
(p. 227). This additional requirement-that as a practical matter 
rights must be grounded in public support-is completely inconsis-
tent with Berns's earlier position that rights can be determined 
from abstract reasoning about human nature. His criticism of 
Blackmun's dissent is similarly inconsistent with his earlier claims 
about constitutional government not "meddl[ing] in [people's] pri-
vate lives." (p. 154-55). Berns, however, never addresses these ob-
vious tensions. 
Another issue that Berns fails to confront adequately arises 
from his intimations that Brown v. Board of Education11 was cor-
rectly decided, although on the wrong grounds (p. 216). As noted 
previously, Berns's definition of equal protection is extremely nar-
row-"[g]overnors and sheriffs and the rest were ... under ana-
10 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
II 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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tional constitutional obligation to provide the protection of the 
laws to any person within the jurisdiction of their states or coun-
ties" (p. 212)-and, in discussing that clause, Berns indicated that 
it could not provide a basis for invalidating state legislation be-
cause it was addressed more to state executives than state legisla-
tors. Nonetheless, when he discusses Brown and the Court's deci-
sion to hold segregation unconstitutional, Berns writes: 
The black school children were surely being denied a privilege 
that ought to have been enjoyed by all citizens, but, as even 
the most venerable opponents of racial discrimination have 
admitted, the Court did not make it evident that they were 
being denied the equal protection of the laws. The Court 
might have meant that for a state to separate by race is to 
treat races differently and therefore-although the conclusion 
is by no means obvious-unequally; but what it said was that 
"separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," a log-
ical absurdity ... (p. 216).12 
The idea of equal protection employed by Berns to suggest that 
Brown's result might have been reached on other grounds is much 
broader than the definition he had offered earlier. As with his dis-
cussion of Hardwick, Berns here departs from his original view 
without explanation or elaboration. 
These jurisprudential inconsistencies and incoherencies do 
not, however, strike at the heart of the book. Berns's announced 
project is to explain what the framers intended. Confronting the 
book on its own terms requires historical inquiry into the world 
view of the framers and the political leaders of the early republic, 
the world view which Berns asserts should govern our understand-
ing of the Constitution. The discussion that follows-which focuses 
on the ideology behind the Declaration, the relationship between 
the Declaration and the Constitution, and the framers' attitudes 
towards commerce and property-suggests that Berns's historical 
account is substantially inaccurate: it suppresses the enduring im-
portance of non-liberal values and it fails to acknowledge the ideo-
logical diversity among the founders and the ideological change 
that took place within the revolutionary era. 
As has been noted, Berns contends that the Declaration is a 
Lockean document. The position that the document is Lockean is 
certainly one with wide support in the historical literature. For ex-
ample, in The Declaration of Independence, for over a half a cen-
12 Citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
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tury the most influential work on the ideology of the Declaration, 
Carl Becker argued that "Jefferson copied Locke."13 But to assert 
that Jefferson followed Locke is not to say that he recognized an 
absolute property right. 
It is arguable whether Locke recognized such a right. The 
standard formulation of Lockeian unalienable rights has come to 
be (and was in Jefferson's day) "life, liberty and property."14 At 
the same time, Locke recognized two limitations on man's capacity 
to acquire property: no one can take more than he can use, 111 and 
there must be "enough, and as good left in common for others."18 
Whether Locke believed that the introduction of civil law permit-
ted the transcendence of these limits and justified unlimited acqui-
sition of property is a matter of dispute among scholars, and it can 
plausibly be argued that Locke did not accept the transcendence of 
these limitsP 
For Jefferson, at least, the proviso of "enough, and as good left 
in common for others" was clearly one that persisted in the civil 
state and that served to limit the property right. In this country, 
that proviso did not limit acquisition. As historian Stanley Katz 
has written, "[F]or Jefferson, America was the perfect environment 
for the operation of the Lockean theory of property shorn of its 
limitations, for in America the endless abundance of land and the 
inexhaustible continent rendered it unthinkable that either mere 
accumulation or unavailability could deprive each man of his due 
share of the natural stock of plenty."~8 Yet while Jefferson did not 
challenge the legitimacy of individual acquisitions during his polit-
ical career in this country, he did act in accordance with the other 
implication of the proviso and consistently sought to bring about a 
broad distribution of property in society. For example, one of his 
13 Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence 79 (1958). 
1
• Garry Wills, Inventing America 229 (1979). As Wills notes, Locke generally used the 
word "estate" or "fortune" rather than "property," in conjunction with "life" and "liberty." 
See, e.g., John Locke, Treatise on Civil Government, in Treatise on Civil Government and A 
Letter Concerning Toleration 91, para. 137 (Charles L. Sherman ed. 1937)("Treatise")(men 
enter into society in order to "preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes"); id. at 82, para. 
123 (men enter into society for the "mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and 
estates"). 
'" Locke, Treatise on Civil Government at 21, para. 31. 
16 Id. at 19, para. 27. 
17 Compare C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism 203, 
211 (1962) (civil law justifies unlimited appropriation) with James Tully, A Discourse on 
Property 152-54, 165 (1980) (satisfaction of the proviso is a precondition of exclusive 
possession). 
18 Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary 
America, 19 J.L. & Econ. 467, 475 (1976). 
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proposed drafts of Virginia's constitution provided that everyone 
who had never owned fifty acres of land should be allotted that 
amount of property. A similar concern is reflected in Jefferson's 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and in his decision to make the Loui-
siana Purchase of 1803.19 Moreover, during his ambassadorship to 
France, when Jefferson confronted a situation in which there was 
not "enough, and as good left in common for others," he concluded 
that the system of property holdings "violate [ d] natural right. "20 
He wrote in a letter home to James Madison: 
Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and un-
employed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been 
so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given 
as a common stock for man to labour and live on. If, for the 
encouragement of industry we allow it to be appropriated, we 
must take care that other employment be furnished to those 
excluded from the appropriation. If we do not the fundamen-
tal right to labour the earth returns to the unemployed. It is 
too soon yet in our country to say that every man who cannot 
find employment but who can find uncultivated land, shall be 
at liberty to cultivate it, paying a moderate rent. But it is not 
too soon to provide by every possible means that as few as 
possible shall be without a little portion of land. The small 
landowners are the most precious part of a state.21 
None of the above is offered to suggest that Jefferson was bent 
on a program of economic redistribution. He clearly was not. But it 
does explain how he could be a Lockean-in the sense of holding 
that the end of government is to secure individual liberty-without 
being committed to an absolute property right (assuming that such 
a commitment is in fact Lockean). For Jefferson, the property 
right was not one of the unalienable rights. It was conditioned on 
the satisfaction of the requirement that there be "enough, and as 
good left in common." This understanding of Jefferson accords 
with the Declaration's proclamation of the right to "Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness," rather than "Life, Liberty and 
Property." 
In addition, there is a non-Lockean reading of the Declaration 
that also accords with the substitution of "pursuit of Happiness" 
19 I d. at 4 70-73. 
'" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 Thomas Jeffer-
son, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 681, 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1953). 
21 Id. 
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for "Property." In Inventing America, Garry Wills contends that 
the Declaration reflected the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
rather than Locke. In developing this thesis, Wills notes that Jef-
ferson had been trained in this school of thought by his teachers, 
whereas there is no parallel evidence of Jefferson's pre-1776 expo-
sure to Locke's Second Treatise. Moreover, linguistic similarities 
exist between the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment thinker 
Frances Hutcheson and the Declaration.22 Berns seems to regard 
Wills's book as posing the principal threat to his own interpreta-
tion of the Declaration, and devotes his appendix to a critique of 
Wills's argument that the Constitution, rather than the Declara-
tion, brought this nation into being (pp. 242-51). Berns also con-
vincingly argues that the linguistic similarities between the Decla-
ration and Locke's Second Treatise indicate that Jefferson was 
familiar with the work (pp. 247-48).23 But he never tries to rebut 
Wills's contention that the dominant influence on Jefferson was 
Scottish Enlightenment thought. 
The significance of such an influence for interpretion of the 
Declaration is two-fold. First, in Scottish Enlightenment thought 
the property right is not an unalienable right. This school of 
thought is communitarian, and community interests are seen as 
limiting the right to property.24 To the extent that Wills is right, 
then, the property right was not inalienable for Jefferson. 
Second, rights in the Scottish Enlightenment school do not 
consist, as they do in Locke's thinking, of a power that an individ-
ual can assert over-against the state.2~ Rather, according to Wills, 
"[r]ight arises in, and because of, society; it is a power over others 
so long as benevolence or innocence are directing the powers. The 
test is public good."26 Thus, Frances Hutcheson offered the follow-
ing definition of right: 
Whenever it appears to us that a faculty of doing, demanding, 
or possessing anything, universally allowed in certain circum-
stances, would in the whole tend to the general good, we say 
that any person in such circumstances has a right to do, pos-
sess, or demand that thing. And according as this tendency to 
•• See, e.g., Wills, Inventing America at 167-92, 229-39 (cited in note 14). 
23 Thus, Berns writes: "The Declaration speaks of a 'long train of abuses,' for example, 
a phrase taken word for word from section 225 of the Treatise, and of "mankind [being] 
more disposed to suffer," which, in section 230 of the Treatise reads, 'the people, who are 
more disposed to suffer'" (pp. 247-48). 
•• Wills, Inventing America at 217, 229-39 (cited in note 14). 
•• Id. at 213. 
•• Id. at 216. 
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the public good is greater or lesser, the right in question is 
greater or less. 27 
The critical freedom is thus not freedom from, but freedom to. To 
put it another way, rights concern what the individual can do, as 
opposed to what the state cannot do. 
If one assumes (as Berns does not) that courts have a special 
role to play in protecting and defining rights, and if one also ac-
cepts that Jefferson embraced the non-liberal notion that the indi-
vidual's participation in the polity is a critically important aspect 
of the pursuit of happiness,28 the importance of this alternative 
rights theory in terms of the jurisprudential significance of the 
Declaration is immense. Judicial elaboration of the Scottish En-
lightenment notion of rights would then involve judicial action 
designed to ensure that the individual was equipped to enter fully 
into the life of the polity. Significantly, although essentially unno-
ticed, some early state court cases embody such a rights notion. 
The most striking example is Trustees of the University of 
North Carolina v. Foy and Bishop,29 in which the North Carolina 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an act of the legislature re-
pealing an earlier grant of all escheated lands to the state univer-
sity. The court based its holding on two grounds. First, it held that 
the second statute violated the law of the land provision of the 
state constitution because no individual or organization could be 
deprived of liberties or properties "until the judiciary of the coun-
try in the usual and common form, pronounce them guilty of such 
acts, as will, in law, amount to a forfeiture of their rights or a dis-
solution of their body."30 This ground for decision led Professor 
Edward Corwin to proclaim Foy the first substantive due process 
case.31 
More interesting for our purposes, however, is the other basis 
for the holding, the court's determination that the second statute 
ran afoul of the provision of the state constitution establishing a 
state university. The court justified its holding here by a series of 
rhetorical questions: 
27 Id., quoting Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue (1725). 
28 See Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited, 43 Wm. & Mary Q. 3, 18-19 
(1986). 
29 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 53 (1805). 
30 Id. at 79. 
31 Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 
Harv.L.Rev. 366, 380-83 (1911). 
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Is then, this last act authorised by the constitution, or does it 
destroy a right which that instrument gave to the people, a 
right highly esteemed in all civilized nations, that of educating 
their youth at a moderate expense? a right of acquiring 
knowledge and good morals, which have always been deemed 
most conducive to the happiness and prosperity of the 
people?32 
This second holding was clearly not compelled by the constitu-
tional text. The relevant provision merely provided that there be a 
state university, not that it be funded in a certain way. The court 
apparently saw its role as one of ensuring that the preconditions of 
civic life were satisfied. Foy and Wills suggest, then, that the Dec-
laration was part of an ongoing American tradition, one that 
stressed freedom to,...as well as freedom from.33 Under this concep-
tion, rights include that which the individual needs to participate 
in the life of the polity. 
Ultimately, it is probably wrong to attempt to reduce the Dec-
laration to either a Scottish Enlightenment document or a Lockean 
document. Both readings of the document are coherent and both 
arguments for influence plausible. Moreover, it seems likely that at 
the time of the writing of the Declaration Jefferson had never 
faced a situation in which the fundamental tensions between the 
two philosophies had to be resolved. It also seems unlikely that in 
a political document Jefferson would opt for philosophical rigor 
over broad appeal. Thus, the Declaration probably reflects an in-
tentional ambiguity. As Hannah Arendt has written, "[T]he Decla-
ration of Independence . . . still intends us to hear the term 'pur-
suit of happiness' in its two-fold meaning: private welfare as well 
as the right to public happiness, the pursuit of well-being as well as 
being a 'participator in public affairs.' "34 Neither interpretation, 
however, accords with Berns's reading of the Declaration. Both 
readings indicate that communitarianism played a critical role in 
Jeffersonian thought; Berns's does not. While Berns's constitu-
tional jurisprudence turns on what the Declaration means, the doc-
ument does not mean what he says it means. It does not embody 
32 5 N.C. at 75-6. 
33 Scottish Enlightenment thought was not the only philosophy with some currency in 
America of this period that stressed freedom to. Although not primarily a rights philosophy, 
classical republicanism also conceptualized rights in this non-liberal way. See Banning, 43 
Wm. & Mary Q. at 18-19 (cited in note 28). 
34 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 129 (1963); see also Banning, 43 Wm. & Mary Q. at 
18 (cited in note 28) (discussing Arendt's insight in terms of current historiographical de-
bate of Jeffersonian ideology). 
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the brand of liberalism he ascribes to it. 
Moreover, the idea that the Declaration should provide the 
basis for constitutional jurisprudence is itself problematic. Implicit 
in much of Berns's analysis is the assumption that the nation's po-
litical leaders shared a common ideology and that the revolution-
ary era did not witness significant ideological change. Admittedly, 
he contends that the framers were liberals who, in the Constitu-
tion, allowed non-liberal politics to persist at the state level. He 
thus acknowledges that a liberal world view was not monolithic. 
But at the same time his analysis is predicated on the idea that, 
with respect to governance of the nation, the major political figures 
shared certain values at all relevant times. This assumption under-
lies Berns's claim to offer "an explanation of the Constitution by 
reference to the Declaration of Independence." But, contrary to 
Berns's contention, the Constitution is not a translation of the 
Declaration's natural rights concerns into principles of governance, 
and that fact underscores both the diversity in and the changing 
nature of revolutionary era political thought. 
Certain differences between the two documents are obvious. 
The Declaration is a rhetorically powerful statement that justifies 
revolution; the Constitution is a legal document that creates a gov-
ernment. Addressing a "candid world," the Declaration appeals to 
"the laws of nature and of nature's god;" the only higher power 
that the Constitution explicitly recognizes is that of "We the Peo-
ple." The differences between the Declaration and the Constitution 
are not, however, simply ones of audience or function. If, in fact, 
the Constitution were meant to embody the Declaration's princi-
ples, it would seem likely that appeals to the Declaration would 
have been frequent in the debate over ratification. But the Decla-
ration did not play a significant role in those debates.35 For exam-
ple, it is quoted only once in The Federalist Papers. Moreover, the 
quoted language does not concern equality or unalienable rights. 
Rather, the Declaration is appealed to for the proposition that the 
people have a right "to abolish or alter their governments as to 
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."36 
According to the dominant view of the American Revolution 
among historians, the ideas that played the most significant role in 
causing the Revolution were derived from classical republicanism 
and English opposition thought. These schools of thought stressed 
that public virtue was the prerequisite for and the proper end of 
30 Wills, Inventing America at 324 (cited in note 14). 
36 Federalist 40, in The Federalist Papers at 247, 253 (cited in note 5). 
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good government, praised self sacrifice and deplored luxury, and 
maintained that the aggressive nature of governmental power con-
stantly endangered public virtue. Influenced by these ideas, Ameri-
cans in the 1770s saw eighteenth century British society as hope-
lessly corrupt and, consequently, viewed the attempts of the 
British ministry in the 1760s and 1770s to expand control over the 
colonies as a direct threat to American virtue. Americans broke 
with England because they came to believe that they faced a sim-
ple choice: American independence or American corruption. 37 
At the time independence was declared, individual liberties 
were not a central concern to most revolutionaries. As Gordon 
Wood has written, "[l]ndividual rights, even the most basic civil 
liberties that we consider so crucial, possessed little of their mod-
ern theoretical relevance when set against the will of the people. "38 
Accompanying this lack of emphasis on individual rights was a de-
votion to legislatures as the voice of the people. In combination, 
these two views led the first state constitutions to place almost all 
governmental power in the hands of state legislatures and allow 
them to act with few checks.39 
The Constitution reflects a significantly different set of con-
cerns and beliefs. The post-independence experience of self-gov-
ernance-an experience marked by interest group conflict both in 
government and in society and by frequent legislative actions that 
aided one segment of society at the expense of others40-convinced 
many of the framers to devote increased attention to limitations on 
the power of the majority and to protections for individual free-
dom. As Madison wrote in Federalist 51, "It is of great importance 
in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression 
of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injus-
tice of the other part."41 The Constitution, because it constrained 
the power of state governments while permitting the national gov-
37 For works that played the most significant role in the development of this interpreta-
tion, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967); J.G.A. 
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (1975); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American 
Republic (1969). For recent historiographical works on the subject of republicanism, see 
Joyce Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 Wm. & Mary Q. 20 (1986); 
Banning, 43 Wm. & Mary Q. (cited in note 28); Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and 
Early American Historiography, 39 Wm. & Mary Q. 334 (1982). 
38 Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 63. 
39 See id. at 162-73. 
40 See Allan Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution 507, 569-72 
(1924) (discussing confiscation of loyalist property and legislative attempts to aid debtors 
through the issuance of paper money and the passage of stay laws). 
41 Federalist 51, in the Federalist Papers at 320, 323. 
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ernment only limited powers subject to elaborate checks and bal-
ances, was intended to limit majoritarian excesses. Hamilton de-
clared, "[T] he Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to 
every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS."42 
The Declaration does not fit easily into the story of ideological 
transformation just described. Its concern is with the threat to 
rights, not virtue. The Declaration would thus seem to state better 
the principles of 1787 than the principles of 1776. While there is an 
obvious irony to this, it accords with the perceived significance of 
the document. In the 1770s and 80s, the Declaration was generally 
treated as important because it declared American independence, 
not because of the way in which it justified that independence. 
Only later did the Declaration come to seem important as a state-
ment of political philosophy.'3 
At the same time, the Declaration's rights philosophy is not 
the rights philosophy behind the Constitution. The progressive his-
torians, for example, believed that the adoption of the Constitution 
was a counterrevolution undoing much of the work of the Revolu-
tion, and argued that the Declaration's spirit is primarily con-
cerned with the rights of man while the Constitution's spirit is 
more practically concerned with the rights of property.44 While the 
progressive argument goes too far-the Constitution is concerned 
with the rights of man as well as the rights of property-it catches 
an essential truth. For Madison and other framers, events of the 
revolutionary era had led to a heightened concern for the protec-
tion of property rights. As Madison wrote Jefferson: 
The necessity of ... guarding the rights of property was for 
obvious reasons unattended to in the commencement of the 
Revolution .... In the existing state of American popula-
tion, & American property the two classes of rights were so 
little discriminated that a provision for the rights of persons 
was supposed to include of itself those of property, and it was 
natural to infer from the tendency of republican laws, that 
these interests would be more and more identified. Experience 
and investigation have however produced more correct ideas 
on this subject. 45 
42 Federalist 84, in id. at 510, 515. 
43 Wills, Inventing America at 324 (cited in note 14). 
" See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians 192-93 (1970). 
" James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia," in 
Robert A. Rutland, Charles F. Hobson, et. a!., eds., 11 Papers of James Madison 287 (1977). 
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As Federalist 10 suggests, the constitutional scheme of checks and 
balances reflects, in part, a concern to protect the right to property 
in a society where "the most common and durable source of fac-
tions has been the verious and unequal distribution of property."46 
As previously suggested, the Declaration does not reflect the same 
concerns for the rights of property-a difference attributable 
partly to Jefferson's authorship and partly to its genesis in a period 
when self sacrifice, rather than economic interest, was stressed. 
Thus, the Declaration and the Constitution both reflect a fun-
damental concern for human rights, but it is the latter document 
that has a special concern for property rights. In view of Berns's 
constitutional jurisprudence, this is ironic. By reading that Decla-
ration into the Constitution, Berns transforms the Constitution, 
which does not explicitly appeal to natural rights, into a natural 
rights document. But that reading cannot introduce a natural right 
to property into the Constitution, since the Constitution is more 
concerned with the property rights than the Declaration. Berns's 
concern for the property right would have been better served by 
ignoring the Declaration, rather than by installing it in a central 
place in constitutional jurisprudence. At the same time, the differ-
ences between the Declaration and the Constitution and the ideo-
logical change that occurred during the revolutionary era highlight 
that the men who Berns refers to as our "statesmen-teachers" (p. 
241) were not all of the same school. As a result, no ideological 
group today can legitimately claim a monopoly on appeals to the 
founders. 
For reasons already discussed, Berns is on more solid grounds 
in asserting that the right to property and the importance of com-
merce played a critical role in the thought of the people who 
drafted and ratified the Constitution. But he takes this point too 
far when he makes the framers into champions of laissez-faire eco-
nomics and the virtue of self-interest. Republicanism-with its 
communitarianism and its stress on self-sacrifice and the impor-
tance of participation in the life of the polity-may not have been 
the dominant influence on economic thought at the time of ratifi-
cation, but it continued to affect the discourse. Certainly at the 
time of ratification, there were many who accepted a laissez-faire 
economic policy and others who stressed self-interest as opposed to 
46 Federalist 10, in The Federalist Papers at 77, 79 (cited in note 5). See also id. at 78 
("The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not 
less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is 
the first object of government."). 
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classical virtue. But relatively few accepted the entire package. 
This point is illustrated by contrasting the Jeffersonian and 
Hamiltonian economic stances, the two dominant stances in the 
early republic. Hamilton believed that government should operate 
realistically and try to harness economic self-interest, rather than 
vainly attempt to inculcate virtue:" For example, he wrote: 
We may preach till we are tired of the theme, the necessity of 
disinterestedness in republics, without making a single prose-
lyte. The virtuous declaimer will neither persuade himself nor 
any other person to be content with a double mess of por-
ridge, instead of a reasonable stipend for his services. We 
might as soon reconcile ourselves to the Spartan community 
of goods and wives, to their iron coin, their long beards, or 
their black broth. There is a total dissimulation in the circum-
stances, as well as the manners, of society among us . . . . 48 
At the same time, it should be noted that, to the extent that Ham-
ilton had come to terms with the benefits that might flow from 
pursuit of self-interest and the inappropriateness of governmental 
encouragement of virtue, his was so much a minority position that 
it was not always politically wise to acknowledge it. The line that 
Hamilton penned for Washington's Farewell Address-"Tis sub-
stantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of pop-
ular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force 
to every species of Free Government" -hardly accords with 
Berns's description of uniform liberalism among the founders.' 9 
While Hamilton and his adherents embraced self-interest, 
however, they did not embrace laissez-faire capitalism. The 
Hamiltonian economic program-which involved, among other 
things, a funded debt and the creation of a national bank-was 
interventionist and can be traced back to non-liberal notions that 
the state had an obligation to promote the general well-being. It 
certainly did not accord with the belief that "government is sup-
posed to leave us alone" (p. 149). 
The Jeffersonian economic program was, in contrast, largely 
laissez-faire and thus, in one sense, more liberal than the 
Hamiltonian program. Moreover, Jeffersonians were not opposed 
47 See Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government 73 
(1970); Katz, 19 J.L. & Econ. at 485-87 (cited in note 18). 
•• Katz, 19 J.L. & Econ. at 485, quoting Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. 
VI, in 3 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 99, 103 (Harold C. Syrett ed. 1962). 
•• Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government at 74 (quoting 
Washington's final manuscript of his Farewell Address) (cited in note 47). 
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to commerce, and it is at least arguable that "[f]or the Jeffersoni-
ans the economy offered an escape from the predicaments implicit 
in traditional ways of looking at social order."~>o But, at the same 
time, Jeffersonians were far from unabashed champions of self-in-
terest. As historian Lance Banning has written: 
The Jeffersonians . . . were still uncomfortable with the 
thought that uninhibited pursuit of market opportunities 
would automatically result in public happiness and harmony 
. . . . They held that individual improvement ought to be re-
strained by residual regard for others, that private satisfac-
tions must sometimes give way to public duties. And they sus-
pected that this commitment to community would be 
endangered if commerce and manufacturing, which they ac-
cepted as the proper narrow top of the pyramid of economic 
enterprise, should become too heavy for the pyramid's broad 
and equal agricultural base.~>1 
The competing visions of Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians thus 
indicate that the framers were far from unabashed champions of 
the pursuit of purely private interests in a market free from gov-
ernment interference. While not hostile to commerce and property, 
the framers were far short of nineteenth century economic liber-
alism. In different ways, they rejected central tenets of the philoso-
phy Berns ascribes to them. 
The final historical issue that merits discussion has a bearing 
not on whether Berns's description of the ideology of the founders 
is accurate, but on his interpretive methodology. As noted, Berns 
states that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause-given 
a "literal reading" (p. 212)-simply obligates state courts to com-
ply with accepted processes of law. This position comports with 
Berns's general position that the meaning of any constitutional 
clause is that which its framers intended and that that meaning is 
either clear from the text or that it can easily be determined with 
certainty by reference to contemporaneous documents. The pre-
fourteenth amendment due process case law illustrates the weak-
ness of this position. 
•• Appleby, 43 Wm. & Mary Q. at 32 (cited in note 37). 
" Banning, 43 Wm. & Mary Q. at 17 (cited in note 28). Banning's position has been 
criticized by Joyce Appleby, who has stressed the purely liberal elements of Jeffersonian 
republicanism. At the same time, Appleby, unlike Berns, has stressed the difference between 
Jeffersonian liberalism and nineteenth century liberalism with respect to notions of a com-
mon good transcending individual interests and the desirability of the unrestrained pursuit 
of economic self-interest. See Appleby, 43 Wm. & Mary Q. at 33 (cited in note 37). 
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Before passage of the fourteenth amendment, there was a 
body of case law interpreting due process clauses (or analogous law 
of the land clauses) to encompass what we today think of as sub-
stantive due process. Most notably, the Dred Scott'"2 decision in-
voked what we would today consider substantive due process. The 
Court there held, "[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of 
the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he 
came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of 
the United States, and who had committed no offense against the 
laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of 
law."~3 Moreover, a number of antebellum state court cases em-
ployed substantive due process to overturn state legislation. ~4 One 
example, University of North Carolina v. Foy, has already been 
discussed. Another leading example, this one from the eve of the 
Civil War, is Wynehamer v. State of New York,~~ in which the 
New York Court of Appeals overturned a state statute that permit-
ted the destruction of intoxicating liquors. The court held such de-
struction impermissible, even when accompanied "by the forms 
which belong to 'due process of law.' "~6 
As William Nelson has pointed out, there is no conclusive evi-
dence as to whether the draftsmen of§ 1 of the fourteenth amend-
ment had such cases in mind and meant to incorporate substantive 
due process into the amendment.~7 Two lessons can, however, be 
drawn from those cases. First, Berns's suggestion that the clause as 
originally drafted necessarily meant only that courts had to comply 
with accepted processes of law is wrong. The search for the clause's 
meaning is not resolved by an examination of the "literal" meaning 
of the words used since the framers could plausibly have had in 
mind at least two meanings. More broadly, this limited case law 
suggests that, regardless of what the framers of the Constitution 
thought about judicial methodology, the framers of the fourteenth 
amendment had reason to know that judges read indeterminate 
clauses broadly, rather than searching for fixed, narrow meanings. 
That background understanding can fairly be held to have in-
formed their use of indeterminate clauses when they wrote the 
fourteenth amendment. Use of the phrase "due process" arguably 
02 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
03 58. Id. at 450. See also Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law and Politics 206 (1981) 
(quoted language was an "emphatic assertion of the principle of 'substantive due process' "). 
•• See Corwin, 24 Harv.L.Rev. at 460 (cited in note 31). 
•• 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). 
•• Id. at 420. 
57 William Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment chap. III (forthcoming). 
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invited judicial activism. 
Of course, arguments to the contrary can be made, but my 
point here is not to contend for one or another reading of the due 
process clause. It is, rather, to offer one example of why original 
intent is elusive in a way that Berns, in a book about original in-
tent, never acknowledges. 
* * * * 
Taking the Constitution Seriously seeks to make two uses of 
the ideology of the framers. It is an attempt by Berns to lay claim 
to the moral mantle of the founders. In the introduction to the 
book, he writes of historians who have minimized the importance 
of the Declaration in American history, "[T]hey know, with the Bi-
ble, that 'in the beginning was the word,' and they do not want 
America's word to be the word spoken in the Declaration" (p. 17). 
He adds, "It is probably true that all nations are affected in one 
way of another by the manner of their beginnings. . . . . What is 
true of Canada-or of Mexico, France, Britain and the others-is 
even truer of America. More than being affected by its beginning, 
this country is characterized by it" (p. 18). Berns believes that the 
way in which people conceive of their nation and its mission re-
flects, in part, their sense of how and why that nation came into 
being, and he therefore struggles to show that liberalism is the one 
and only word that brought forth this country: it is the word of the 
Declaration, which is the word of the Constitution, which is the 
word of the founders. Taking the Constitution Seriously also rep-
resents an attempt to use the ideology of the framers (as Berns 
conceptualizes it) to support a particular view of what the Consti-
tution should mean. The framers' liberalism, Berns maintains, in-
formed the Constitution they drafted and ratified. Proper respect 
for original intent requires that the liberalism inform modern con-
stitutional interpretation. 
Understanding the worldview of the framers is not, however, 
the simple matter that Berns suggests. The writings of the framers 
reflect a host of tensions. The framers felt the importance of en-
hancing both individual freedom and the common good. By and 
large, they thought both religious freedom and moral education of 
critical importance. They feared self-interest and esteemed self-
sacrifice even as they moved toward greater acceptance of the 
world of commerce. While they differed among themselves as to 
how to resolve these tensions, few had completely accepted the lib-
eralism that Berns claims informed their vision of the national 
government. Commitment to individual rights is part of the legacy 
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left us by the framers of the Constitution. But if we are to take the 
framers seriously, we must also recognize that the founding genera-
tion did not completely break with the past, and that notions of 
communitarianism, of civic obligation and civic participation are 
part of their legacy as well. 
